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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
(5) The W.E.R.B. has jurisdiction over organizational and or-
dinary recognition picketing even though interstate commerce is in-
volved or affected.
WILLIAM A. GIGURE
LIABILITY OF SUCCESSIVE INSURERS UNDER
WISCONSIN'S WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT
The Wisconsin Workmens Compensation Act affixes certain ob-
ligations upon the employer and its insurer because of the existence
of the employer-employee relationship.' The fundamental idea of the
statute is to award compensation when the employment causes dis-
ability, whether total or partial, permanent or temporary.2 The Wis-
consin Court has consistently held that disability under the act means
physical inability to perform the ,work in the usual and customary way,
i.e., results in a time or wage loss. Accidents which do not produce
such disability are not compensable.3 No compensation is provided
for what the courts term medical disability such as is found in the
case of occupational diseases where, having been exposed to its cause
the employee contacts the disease, yet suffers no manifestations which
impair his bodily functions so as to cause him to lose time or wages.'
The Act was framed with the idea that there would always be a
definite date, that of the accident, which would be the basis for de-
terming the liability of the employer and its insurance carriers. 6 Since,
the employer's insurance carrier at the time of injury or accident
must pay the award against the employer,7 the time of injury as de-
termined by the act becomes important to successive insurers as well
as to successive employers because the disability must be sustained
at a time when the employer-employee relation exist.
I ACCIDENTAL INJURIES
In the case of accidental injuries, as opposed to occupational dis-
eases, the time of injury or accident and its disability does not pre-
sent too difficult a problem. An accidental injury is an injury that re-
sults from a definite mishap.9 As to accidental injuries the Act, from
' South Side Roofing & Material Co. v. Industrial Comm., 252 Wis. 403, 31 N.W.
2d 577 (1948).
'North End Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm., 217 Wis. 363, 258 N.W. 439(1935).
3 Ibid.; Chain Belt Co. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 116, 264 N.W. 502 (1936).
4 Odanah Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm., 235 Wis. 168, 292 N.W. 439 (1940).
5 Supra, note 2.6 Employer's Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 195 Wis. 410, 217 N.W. 738
(1928).7 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm., 230 Wis. 363, 284 N.W. 36 (1939).
8 Shaefer & Co. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 289, 265 N.W. 390 (1930).
9 Andrzeczak v. Industrial Comm., 248 Wis. 12, 20 N.W. 2d 551 (1945).
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its inception, has been substantially the same as it now stands, defining
the time of .injury as the date of the accident which caused the injury
regardless of the time when disability in fact becomes recognizable.1 0
Time, of injury is easily determined in these cases for the disability is
usually immediate in point of time. Establishing the time of injury,
the liability is easily placed on the employer and insurer as of that
time if the conditions of the act are met i.e., where at time of injury
both employer and employee were subject to the Act, employee per-
formed services of his employment, injury arose out of the employ-
ment, injury was not intentionally self-inflicted and so forth.'"
The difficulty in these accidental injury cases arises when the em-
ployee suffers two identical compensable injuries in his employment
under successive employers and their insurers, or under one employer
with successive insurers. The Court has uniformly held that the clear
intent and purpose of the Act is to burden the particular industry in
which the injury occurs, with the resulting damage.12 The relationship
of the two injuries and the cause of the later disability then become
important in placing the burden. While it is said to be immaterial that
the fact that there was a pre-existing physical condition, whether in-
herent or the result of prior injury, without which no serious injury
would have resulted from the subsequent accident,'13 it is equally true
that:
"When the pre-existing condition is so thoroughly established
and is of such a serious nature that what happens thereafter,
cannot reasonably be held to be the result of a subsequent ac-
cident no award would be allowed.... no compensation is pay-
able where a pre-existing condition causes the disability inde-
pendent of any subsequent mishap."' 4
Therefore, where the relationship of the two injuries or accidents is
of such a nature, no liability for compensation can be placed on a suc-
cessive insurer subject to the risk at the date of the second accident
in the absence of a finding that the second accident was a substantially
contributing factor to the disability. 15
Where the second or subsequent accident is claimed to have re-
sulted from physical weakness due to the prior injury or injuries in
order to recover compensation from the prior insurer or employer
the employee must show that the subsequent injury:
10 Ibid.
"I WIs. STATS. (1951), sec. 102.03.
"M Murphy Supply Co. v. Fredrickesen, 206 Wis. 210, 239 N.W. 420 (1931).
33 Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Industrial Comm. 239 Wis. 455, 1 N.W. 2d
802 (1942).
'4 Employer's Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 212 Wis. 669, 250 N.W.
759 (1933).
'5 Merten Lbr. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 260 Wis. 109, 50 N.W. 2d 42 (1951).
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".. . can be traced back to and have some (substantial) causal
connection with the first injury occuring while in the immed-
iate service of the employer."'1
In South Side Roofing & Material Co. v. Industrial Comnission,
an employee sustained three successive injuries to his back over a
period of about five years. Each accident occured while he was em-
ployed by a different employer. Compensation was paid by the suc-
cessive insurers on each accident. Later, when unemployed, he again
became disabled due to his back condition and claimed compensation
from the three former employers. The Industrial Commission found
solely on the basis of its earlier files on the case, that each injury ag-
gravated the other and that the disability was the cumulative effect
of all three. The Commission then made an award dividing the liabil-
ity equally among the three employers. At none of the previous hear-
ings had there been a finding of partial permanent injury or any at-
tempt to determine the degree of partial permanent disability. The
CouR refused to sustain the award saying:
"No new evidence has been introduced at this time to warrant
the conclusion thaat each injury did in fact contribute to a
partial permanent injury or disability a condition which was not
apparent at the time of the injuries. To justify assessing either
employer here sought to be charged with the one third compen-
sation . . . , the Commission ought to have found upon com-
petent evidence that the only causes of his present disability
were those three injuries and that each was equal in casual ef-
fect to each of the other."'"
In its discussion the court also said that had there been a finding of
partial permanent disability sustained by the first accident the first
employer could be burdened with that portion of the award attributable
thereto. If it was found that the second accident caused or contributed
further to this partial permanent disability the second employer would
be liable for that increased disability and the same result would follow
as to the last accident.
II OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
A. Prior to 1933
In 1919 the Wisconsin Legislature created liability under the Com-
pensation Act for disability due to occupational diseases.', An occupa-
tional disease is a disability acquired over an appreciable period of
'r Western Lime & Cement Co. v. Boll, 194 Wis. 606, 217 N.W. 303 (1928). No
reason to believe cause as used here differs from that in Pfeifer v. Standard
Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W. 2d 29 (1952).
17 Supra, note 1.
18 Supra, note 9.
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time as the result of exposure in the employment.19 Compensation
therefore was deemed advisable for:
"When an employee gives up his work because he is physically
unable to perform it in the usual and customary way, that point
of time in the progress of occupational disease is quite com-
parable to an accident which also prevents him from continu-
ing to perform service.120
In its amendment of the Act to cover occupational diseases, the
legislature failed to define what it understood to be time of accident
in occupational disease cases and the Court was required to hold that:
"... the time of accident within the meaning of the statute in
occupational disease cases should be the time when disability
first occurs ."..21
The Court felt that such interpretation was necessary to prevent
difficulties in administration of the Act and in addition to protect the
rights of both employer and employee. It felt that if the date the
disease had its inception was to be used, the employee would have to
give notice of every slight ailment which might be the incipient stage
of some occupational disease, requiring employers to investigate all
such notices of claims.2 2 The Legislature recognized that rule. 23
In applying the Act to the cases before it the Court was forced to
hold that in the case of occupational disease:
".. . because the statute bases the liability to pay compensation
upon the disability and not exposure, the rule is that the em-
ployee suffering from an occupational disease is entitled to be
compensated if at the time of disability the relation of employer
and employee existed. '24
Where the employee is exposed to and contacts an occupational
disease under one employer, but suffers the disability after further
exposure while in the employ of a subesquent employer, only the last
employer and its insurer at the time of disability must pay the com-
pensation awarded. 25 The same rule applies when one employer has
had successive insurers, only the insurer at the time of disability is
liable.
The situation often arose where the employee suffered a number of
disabilities due to occupational disease each under a different employer
or while different insurers were on the risk for one employer. There
9 Supra, note 9.
20Supra, note 2.
21 Zurich General Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 203 Wis. 135,
233 N.W. 772 (1930).
22Supra, note 6.
2 Chain Belt Co. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 116, 264 N.W. 502 (1936).
24Kimlark Rug Corp. v. Stansfield, 210 Wis. 319, 246 N.W. 424 (1933).
25 Supra, note 6, Kennenberg Granite Co. v. Industrial Comm., 212 Wis. 651,
250 N.W. 821 (1933).
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the question of recurrence or new attack of disease became important
for the purpose of ascertaining which insurance carrier or which em-
ployer and its carrier would be liable.
"Recovery from the disease which had caused disability before
entering the employment of the last employer, and a new onset
of disease causing disability after he enters such last employ-
ment must occur in order to render such last employer liable
for compensation...26
There must be this causal relationship between the disease and the
work performed in the employment, in order to burden the last em-
ployer or insurers, because the purpose of the Act is to place the
burden of disability on the employer and industry which caused or
contributed to it.
As the Act stood prior to 1933 many employees found themselves
in a situation in which they had been exposed to and contacted an oc-
cupational disease in the service of an employer, but became disabled
while employed by a subsequent employer who did not contribute to
the disability, or while they were unemployed. The employer who ex-
posed him was not liable because the employee was not in his employ-
ment at the time of the disability. 28 The employer in whose service
he was at the time of the disability and who, did not contribute to
the disability was not liable because the occupational disease was not
an incident of and did not grow out of that employment.29 Such a re-
sult under the Act saw the employer taking this opening in the Act
to escape liability as they took the opportunity to discharge the em-
ployees who had medical disabilities before the compensable disability
occured.30 In these cases, where the Court was required to hold that
the employer and insurer were not liable for compensation, it often
called the attention of the Legislature to this particular shortcoming
in the Act concerning occupational diseases."' It was not until 1933
that the Legislature responded.
BI. Subsequent to the 1933 Amendment
By the 1933 amendment the Legislature defined the time of ac-
cident or injury in the case of occupational disease as "the last day
28 Outboard Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm., 206 Wis. 131, 239 N.W. 141 (1931).
Also, Zurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Comm.,
203 Wis. 135, 233 N.W. 772 (1930).27Hayes v. Ajax Rubber Co. Inc., 202 Wis. 218, 231 N.W. 584 (1930).2sSupra, note 24; Sivyer Steel Casting Co. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 252,
263 N.W. 565 (1935).
29 Supra, note 27.30 Supra, note 23; Motor Casting Co. v. Industrial Comm., 219 Wis. 204, 262 N.W.
577 (1935); Sivyer Steel Casting Co. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 252,
263 N.W. 565 (1935).31 Supra, note 23.
[Vol. 37
COMMENTS
of work for thelast employer, whose employment caused disability. '3 2
Before the injury complained of can be fixed at any definite time the
employment must cause disability, which remains defined as a time
or wage logs. 3 3In referring to the "employer whose employment caused
disability" the statute intends reference to the last employer whose
employment contributed substantially to furthering the progress of the
disabilities.34
The amendment was intended to supplement the law as it stood
prior to 1933 not to change it.s5 It was designed to cover those specific
situations in yhich disability occured after the relation of employer-
employee terminated. 36
The Wisconsin Court has held that the disability must be sustained
at a time when employer-employee relation exists.3T The Act now de-
clares that the time of injury in case of occupational disease shall be
the last day of work for last employer whose employment caused the
disability.
"This obviously refers the 'time of injury' back to a point of
time when the employer and employee relationship existed." 8
The amendment does not contemplate that the compensation awarded
in those cases shall, as a matter of course, be paid from the last day
of work.39
Where the employee sustains disability while in the service of the
employer whose employment caused or contributed to disability, the
date of liability of the employer and insurer is thereby fixed and the
amendment has no application.40
SUMMARY
Under the present state of the law the liability of successive em-
ployers and successive insurers may be said to rest on these principles;
Accidental Injuries:
Time of injury is the date of the accident which caused the in-
jury.41 The employer at the "time of injury" and the insurance car-
rier at the "time of injury" are liable. Where there are two or more
accidental injuries, then there must be a determination whether the
3 2 Milwaukee Malleable & Gray Iron Works v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 244,
263 N.W. 662 (1933).
"
3 Ibid. See also Shaefer & Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra, note 8.3 4 Montello Granite Co. v. Industrial. Comm., 227 Wis. 170, 278 N.W. 391 (1938).
35 General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 221 Wis. 540,
266 N.W. 224 (1936).
36 Ibid.; see also citation in note 32, supra.37 Supra, note 8.
as Supra, note 8.3 9 Supra, note 34.
40 Supra, note 35.42 Supra, note 10.
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subsequent injury is merely a recurrence without aggravation of the
prior injury or injuries, or whether the subsequent injury is either (a)
a new and independent injury or (b) an aggravation of the continuing
early injury. If it is merely a recurrence of the old injury without ag-
grevation the employer and the insurer as of the time the recurrence
takes place are not liable.42 If the subsequent injury is a new and in-
dependent injury or an aggravation (in substantially increased degree
of the early injury) the employer and the insurer at that "time of
injury" are liable for the additional disability which the second ac-
cident inflicted.4 3
Occupational Diseases:
Time of injury is the last day of work for the last employer whose
employment caused disability.4 4 The employer and the insurer as of
that time are liable for the consequences of such disability. 45 If the
disability is sustained while the employee is still in the employ of the
employer who exposed him, liability is fixed as of that date of dis-
ability. 6 Where there has been an apparent recovery from a former
disability causing disease and there is a subsequent exposure and dis-
ability occurs, there must be a determination whether this subsequent
disability arose from a recurrence, or whether it is due to a new onset
induced by subsequent exposure, or whether it is due in part to both
such causes operating together. If the Commissioner's findings from
the evidence do not support recurrence in any degree, the employer
and the carrier at the time the disability manifests itself are liable.47
If the later liability is due entirely or in part to the recurrence, the em-
ployer and the insurer at the time of original disability must bear their
assigned share of the compensation for the subsequent disability.48
In regard to occupational disease,". . . the 1933 amendment im-
poses upon the trier of fact, in cases involving claims of disability
made after the relation of employer and employee has ceased, a much
greater responsibility than that which inheres in the determination of
ordinary claims arising out of accidental injuries. . .However, it is
a responsibility which can be met and in which sound and impartial
conclusions can be reached, upon which just awards may be based."' 9
WILLIAM H. BEzOLD
Marquette L.L.B., 1953
42 Supra, notes 14 and 15.43Supra, note 1.
44 Supra, note 10.
45Supra, note 7.
46 Supra, note 35.
47Supra, note 6; Kennenberg Granite Co. v. Industrial Comm., 212 Wis. 551,
250 N.W. 821 (1933).8sSupra, note 26.
49Supra, note 34.
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